US NEWS

Feedback | What does ‘popularity’ look like in practice?


My colleague Ezra Klein wrote his latest column by David Shore, a Democratic polling analyst whose primary message is to win over the critics of the Democratic Party, his college-educated professional class working-class, non-college-educated voters. Here is Ezra with a little more detail:

The Democratic Party Twitter workers were trapped in an echo chamber and woke up the workers. It has lost contact with working-class voters of all ethnic groups in order to win elections, and even progressive organizations dedicated to data analysis are refusing to face the hard truths of public opinion and electoral geography.

Shore argues, the key issue is the polarization of voters through education. Voters who graduated from college have moved sharply toward Democrats and those voters who have not moved sharply toward Republicans. The problem for Democrats is that most voters do not attend college. The single largest group of voters is, in fact, white people without a college degree. And those voters have crowded into the Republican Party since the 2016 presidential election.

If those voters were concentrated in a few states, it would not be such an advantage. But they are everywhere, including most swing states.

Donald Trump’s Republican Party may not be able to win a crude majority in national elections, but its hold on non-college volunteers (as well as non-college black and Hispanic voters, especially men) means it could easily win the system where your vote Geography is as important as the number of your votes. The Senate, in particular, will almost certainly return to the hands of Republicans, and there is no guarantee that Democrats will win the vote. Here is Ezra, the Shore Channel:

If 2024 is just a normal year, with Democrats winning 51 percent of the bipartisan vote, the Shore model offers a loss of seven seats compared to the current position. Sit down with it. Senate Democrats could win 51 percent of the bipartisan vote in the next two elections and win only one seat in the Senate.

To push back the polarization of education, Shore believes Democrats should talk less about racial justice and immigration যা which he argues, has pushed non-college voters, especially whites, away from the Democratic Party এবং and integrated their message with the economy. Preference for non-college majorities. Again, here is Ezra:

The chain of argument is: Democrats are on the brink of electoral abyss. To avoid this, they need to win states that weaken Republicans. To do this, they have to internalize that they are not like them and do not want voters to understand that they have to win. The swing voters in this state are not liberal, do not wake up, and do not see the world the way employees and donors do in a democratic campaign.

Now, for all these restrictions, Shore doesn’t say much about what it actually will be and how it differs from current practice. When he does, he usually gives two examples, one positive, one negative. A positive example is Barack Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign, where Obama ignored issues of race and immigration and focused on economic growth and the record of his rival Mitt Romney, who made his fortune in private equity. A negative example is the 2011 presidential election, when Hillary Clinton tried to counter Donald Trump’s racist message with her own inclusion speech, a move that kept race and immigration at the forefront and pushed college non-whites into more Republican columns.

Shore sees Trump’s significant gains with the 2020 presidential election and Hispanic voters, as another example of what happens when race and ethnic issues dominate a campaign and its media environment:

“In the summer, after the rise of‘ defending the police ’as a nationally important issue, Biden’s support among Hispanic voters has waned,” Shore said in a March interview with New York Magazine. “So I think you can tell this microstory: we have raised the significance of an ideologically charged issue that millions of non-white voters do not agree with us. And then, as a result, these conservative Hispanic voters who were voting for us despite their ideological leanings began to vote like conservative whites.

Here, I must say, I do not think that this analysis is necessarily wrong. Indeed, there is other evidence to substantiate the point.



Source link

Related Articles

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back to top button