Although accused by former Obama administration officials – starting with President Biden himself, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan – the Biden administration’s foreign policy team has made a tougher decision than the previous Democratic White House policy challenge. They can lead more effectively by widening the circle of their partners at home.
Acknowledging the role the Trump administration has played in identifying and addressing threats to the Chinese Communist Party’s free and open international system, it is clear that the Biden administration wants to live up to its promise and work hard to address political divisions in the United States.
In response to China’s rise, the Obama administration has implemented a “key part of Asia.” According to Kenneth Liberthal, a professor at the University of Michigan, the change recognizes America’s need to “play a leading role in Asia for decades to come.” Shortly after his inauguration, President Biden went ahead with an official White House speech. Following in the footsteps of the Trump administration, Biden declared the People’s Republic of China “our most serious rival” while emphasizing “China’s growing ambition to compete with the United States.” Biden promised to “deal with China’s economic abuse; Resist his aggressive, coercive actions; Pushing back China’s aggression on human rights, intellectual property and global governance. ”
By distancing itself from the Trump administration’s policies in numerous ways, the current administration has maintained or increased Trump sanctions and tariffs on China. The Trump administration has come out to criticize Beijing’s unfair trade practices and widespread criminal theft of intellectual property. And, with former Foreign Minister Mike Pompeo’s January 2021 resolution that China is committing crimes against humanity and genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the new administration has condemned China’s “horrific human rights violations.” At the UN on Tuesday, Biden refrained from referring to China, but perhaps reiterating the US commitment to the inherent rights of all individuals. And pledge U.S. readiness to oppose authoritarian forces seeking to influence them.
The position of the Biden administration is much higher than that of its predecessors in the last 50 years in keeping pace with the Trump administration. For decades after President Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, the dominant view in the United States was that bilateral engagement with Beijing and China’s inclusion in the international community would bring home the repressive one-party state of the Chinese Communist Party, its nationalist claims to Hong Kong and Taiwan Relationships. Over the years, a small but growing number of scholars have questioned the pink assessment. The Trump administration has taken a clear break with a series of high-profile administration lectures and a series of conventional wisdom from countless classless papers, including the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and the 2020 U.S. Strategic Approach to the People. People’s Republic of China.
In November 2020, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, led by me, published “The Elements of the China Challenge.” This paper combines various aspects of the Trump administration’s analysis by establishing the CCP’s hegemonic ambitions in the CP historical and geopolitical context; Determining the main features and animation concepts of Chinese behavior; And to enumerate what the United States must do to effectively oppose the restructuring of world politics in the CCP.
Policy planning staff argued that it was inevitable to anticipate America’s growth toward liberal democracy, as well as the neglect of the foreign policy body’s CCP’s authentic utterances and writings that blinded the United States to Beijing’s long-standing determination to issue international orders with authoritarian standards. We have surveyed economic co-opted and coercive projects backed by a huge and expanded economy, the CCP deployed in every region of the world, as well as its efforts to turn a global military development and international organization to its will.
We have also examined the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship that imposes the CCP on China’s 1.4 billion people, and China’s extreme nationalism that seeks to keep Beijing at the center of a restructured world order. We have summarized the many and varied weaknesses of CCP. And we have come to the conclusion that the United States must take a number of steps to address the Chinese challenge. These include strengthening the U.S. military; Re-evaluating our alliance system and international organizations with the aim of restructuring both to deal with the current round of cosmic competition; And training a new generation of diplomats, foreign policy experts and defense analysts in Mandarin and science and technology. Above all, we emphasize, it was the responsibility of the leaders to rebuild the nation for the principle of independence under American constitutional discipline and to provide a lasting foundation of civic solidarity in our extraordinarily diverse nation.
It is gratifying that each of these proposals finds strong support in Rush Doshi’s thoroughly researched and hard-working logical book, “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Display American Order.” It is noteworthy that Doshi, who was the founding director of the Brookings Institution in China and currently serves as China’s director of the Biden administration’s National Security Council, has given the reader little indication of the evolving convergence of views between Democrats and Republicans. China Challenge.
Conversations with relevant scholars, knowledge of military matters, a thorough reading of diplomatic history, and the seemingly encyclopedic command of CCP speeches and documents, party media, and Chinese think tanks, China’s evolving strategy to deal with. His detailed analysis leaves no doubt that the CCP seeks to replace the US-led free and open international system with a Chinese-led liberal and anti-democratic government with friendly orders.
Since Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, started China’s economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s by incorporating free-market elements, according to Doshi, the PRC has adopted three separate “displacement strategies.” As China quickly acquired wealth, Deng insisted on “hiding power and giving time.” Doshi referred to it as the “Traumatic Triphacta” – China’s volatile 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, America’s rapid and decisive victory in the 1991 Iraq war, and the abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 – the CCP concluded that a powerful United States, the world’s only Became a major threat, requiring action to curb American influence in Asia. The global financial crisis of the year 200 convinced the CCP that the weak West and its own growing power had ended the time of “hiding and concealing”. In the words of then-President Hu Jintao, the moment came to “actively do something”, which translated into creating an alternative economic and political order within the Indo-Pacific Ocean. In 2016, in the election of Brexit and Donald Trump, General Secretary Xi Jinping came to the conclusion that the fall of the West was irreversible. Such “big changes invisible in a century,” Xi declares, enables China to expand its order-building throughout the world.
“Together, these regional and then global strategies provide a rough way to climb for the nationalist elites of the Chinese Communist Party, who want to bring China back to its rightful place and reverse the historic change in the West,” Doshi wrote.
Doshi argues that the Chinese-dominated U.S. will only play into the hands of the CCP. Moreover, the prospects for change in China are slim, not least because Beijing’s already extraordinary economic power is bound to grow, which will further encourage the party. Accordingly, Doshi sketches a mandatory “dissenting strategy” to enable the United States to win the competition with Beijing over the shape of the world order. His case would have been stronger and better for the country if the Trump administration had seen his recommendations fit well with China policy.
The United States, for example, should maintain “resistance by denial” in the Doshi Indo-Pacific region, which includes unmanned aircraft, submarines with large missile loads, mine warfare, and assistance to allies, partners and friends (Taiwan, Japan, India). , Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia) must do the same – as specified in the Trump administration’s national security strategy. In addition, Doshi suggested that the United States reduce China’s control over infrastructure in other countries by creating new types of cooperation and more effective public-private partnerships with friends to help developing countries – consistent with Secretary Pompeo’s Quartet revival (Japan, India, Australia, and the US). United States) and the Trump administration’s efforts to diversify and refine American foreign aid. And the United States, the culprit argues, should inform the world about the scale of CCP corruption and the dangers of CCP authoritarianism – as National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, FBI Director Christopher Warr, Attorney General William Barre and Secrer said in the Trump administration’s keynote speech last summer.
Doshi appreciates that a wide array of such arrangements would require a coordinated national effort. In concluding his book, he rightly claims that “a constructive China policy” relies on “American leaders” who can “find positive ways to rebuild solidarity and civic identity that make democracy work.”
It is even more unfortunate that Doshi has missed the opportunity to build trust and understanding by acknowledging the emerging sensitivities about the China challenge.
There is too much risk for biased attitudes to obscure the public interest in building a unified American system.